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Abstract
Empirical research on the impact and determinants of group lending is by
now substantial. However, very little is known about the possible role of col-
lateral to mitigate incentive problems in group lending. This is because micro-
credit programs have normally been implemented in rural areas of developing
countries. Indeed, the reason for this choice is lack of credit access since agents
with collateral are very rare. Also, to the extent that rural communities have
tight-knit hierarchical structures information about borrowers is accessible and
the enforcement of sanctions via social networks makes collateral superﬂuous
for default mitigation. Yet, in an urban setting in which information is more
atomized and social sanctions are not as powerful, collateral may have an impor-
tant role in group lending. First, we illustrate in a model the role of collateral
to mitigate group default. Second, we use data from a group lending program
implemented in 2001 in Cotonou, the largest city in Benin with more than
one million inhabitants. We empirically explore the risk proﬁle of individual
borrowers and resulting group heterogeneity to identify the role of personal
contributions to investment projects. Our evidence suggests that while diversi-
ﬁcation within groups facilitates risk pooling, it also increases expected bailout
or group default costs for low risk borrowers. Collateral helps oﬀset and allevi-
ate potential negative spillovers from group default induced by membership of
borrowers with risky projects. The presence of borrowers with collateral facili-
tates access to credit for group members without collateral, who in turn provide
insurance against group default. We ﬁnd joint liability to be a mechanism for
risk sharing in a setting where poor households lack resources for collateral and
insurance markets are missing.
Keywords: Group lending, mutual cosigners, collateral, risk sharing, strate-
gic default, bailout costs.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In recent years microﬁnance has transformed from being an experimental alternative
to formal and informal sources of credit to being a model for lending programs to
the poor and a development tool for poverty alleviation. Microﬁnance has allowed
credit to the poor beyond the traditional ﬁnancial frontiers insofar as lack of col-
lateralizable assets has been overcome by group lending in tight-knit communities.
Social cohesion giving rise to norms and sanctions to deter default has provided a
form of social collateral in group lending situations. Also, knowledge transmission via
social networks reduces information asymmetry within communities. Hence, in small
villages with high poverty rates and limited availability of resources for collateral, so-
cial capital has become a catalyst for the successful implementation of joint liability
credit programs. In order to expand the traditional ﬁnancial frontiers, microﬁnance
has developed tailored ﬁnancial services based on a set of incentives for borrowers
to repay their loans and for lenders to provide innovative ﬁnancial products. The
result has been high repayment rates that guarantee the long-term sustainability of
ﬁnancial organizations.
The successful performance of microﬁnance institutions has been extensively de-
bated, especially in terms of the methods of credit delivery. In particular, group
lending receives most of the interest in research and in practice. The key feature of
this contractual method is shared liability making the entire group responsible for the
loans given to individual borrowers. First, group lending mitigates information asym-
metry. Joint liability, inducing borrowers to carefully self-select choose their groups,
can provide a solution to adverse selection faced by lending institutions (Ghatak,
1999; van Tassel, 1999; Armendariz and Gollier, 2000) At the same time peer moni-
toring mitigates moral hazard (Stiglitz, 1990; Banerjee, Besley and Guinnane, 1994;
Armendariz, 1999; Wydick, 1999 and 2001). Second, group lending facilitates enforce-
ment of penalties on defaulters when borrowers have close ties (Besley and Coate,
1995; Wydick, 1996). The potential role of collateral has been absent from the dis-
cussion in the group lending literature by an large. A notable exception is Prescott
and Townsend (2002) who model coalitions pooling resources of agents with perfect
information about each other, allowing for individual resource heterogeneity. Part of
the reason is that joint liability schemes have been designed precisely to overcome
credit inaccessibility when agents lack collateral resources. In particular, group lend-
ing has been most intensively deployed in rural areas in developing countries where
lack of assets is generalized. By delegating borrower selection and monitoring to other
group members, ﬁnancial intermediaries can attain proﬁtable repayment rates even
without collateral. Group members belonging to the same social networks have at
their disposal a larger set of punishment instruments for default than remote ﬁnancial
intermediaries.
Most of the theoretical models are based on the paradigm that credit groups
will form among members of equal risk leading to the hypothesis of homogeneous
2matching. The ﬁrst argument is due to partner selection inducing borrowers in joint
liability agreements to select peers to minimize the expected costs of either bailing out
other group members or costly group default. This implies that the safest borrowers
will only accept other group members with similar risk proﬁles. At the same time, the
riskiest borrowers can only group with partners of similar levels of risk. Therefore,
there will be homogeneous matching in equilibrium, or at least assortative matching,
where any risk heterogeneity is due to the unavailability of partners of the same
type or matching frictions in the group formation process aﬀecting borrowers’ ability
to ﬁnd their preferred partner (Armendariz, 1999). The second line of argument
focuses on adjustments in project selection as borrowers in a group will encourage
their partners into investments no riskier than their own, or will leave risky groups,
resulting in an equilibrium with group members of the same risk (Stiglitz, 1990).
These models generally imply that group homogeneity is optimal. This is partly
due to the assumption of uncorrelated investment returns ruling out beneﬁts from risk
pooling. Loic Sadoulet (2000) has pointed out that while the tolerable degree group
heterogeneity depends on the borrowers’ outside option, in the absence of insurance
markets heterogeneity may be a risk diversiﬁcation vehicle. It is conjectured that
transfers between group members can make coalitions between low and high risk
investors stable. Intra-group insurance is modelled by Wydick (2001) in a dynamic
context as sustainable given that loss of future credit to defaulters is suﬃciently costly.
In the present paper, we consider joint liability agreements as vehicles for risk sharing,
with collateral as the mechanism that makes heterogenous groups sustainable.. When
some but not all agents have collateral, we argue that group lending may be relevant
not only to provide credit to agents without collateral but also to provide insurance
to agents with collateral. This can be especially relevant to borrowers in urban
of developing countries, where social sanctions are limited but interaction between
households with and without collateral resources is feasible.
Empirical research on microcredit has mainly concentrated on group formation
and peer monitoring. The role collateral in joint liability agreements has not empiri-
cally explored yet. In the past, it has been suggested that transfers or side payments
could sustain heterogenous groups in what eﬀectively amounts to high risk members
purchasing insurance from low risk ones. However, there no evidence provided that
such transfers take place. In this paper, we test whether the presence of collateral
facilitates mutual insurance in group formation. Our empirical results show that
heterogenous groups emerge in which members with high risk investment projects
mitigate default prospects through collateral. This shows that joint liability is con-
ducive to insurance provision as long as there is a mechanism for high risk investors
in the group to commit agains strategic default and compensate low risk investor
members.
Attanasio and Davis (1996) have shown that even in the US, where contingent
security markets are far more advanced than in any developing country, the joint cross-
sectional distribution of household earnings and consumption is inconsistent with
3insurance against earnings risk implied by the Arrow-Debreu paradigm. Storesletten,
Telmer and Yaron (2004) show that idiosyncratic earnings shocks realized during the
working life of household members are suﬃciently large and persistent to account for
more than half of the cross sectional variation in earnings in the US. Indeed household
earnings shocks have the same degree of persistence as business cycles shocks, but
their volatility dwarfs that of cyclical ﬂuctuations. Income risk is especially important
in developing countries as a large share of households live close to the subsistence
income threshold. It is essential to enhance the scope for consumption smoothing
and to understand ways in which risk can be shared across households. The analysis
in this paper suggests that the use of group lending in urban areas of developing
countries may be one such way.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related
literature. Section 3 presents a benchmark model to illustrate the role of collateral fro
risk sharing in group lending. Section 4 provides a description of the data. Section
5 discusses the empirical strategy and implications of our results. Finally, section 6
oﬀers concluding remarks.
2 Related Literature
In developing countries, lending institutions possess limited information on the type
and behavior of their clients. However, group lending can enhance the ﬁnancial in-
termediaries’ ability to screen and monitor their borrowers. Microﬁnance institutions
are designed to overcome asymmetric information in the relationship between bank
and borrower, by transferring the screening and monitoring functions at the commu-
nity level to jointly liable borrowers. Reporting the advantages of collective actions
in screening and monitoring with respect to distant bank agents, Stiglitz (1990) and
Varian (1990) emphasize that group members have easy access to information on the
reputation, creditworthiness and eﬀorts of their peer borrowers thus facilitating en-
forcement of loan repayment . However, the repayment performance of group lending
under joint liability may be undermined because of the risk sharing in case of default.
In fact, a member may, intentionally, choose an excessively risky project counting
on the other members to repay. Therefore, if borrowers have perfect information
about each other type, will self-select homogeneously with respect to investment risk
(Stiglitz 1990; Devereux and Fisher 1993; Ghatak, 1999). Given this selection mech-
anism, Ghatak (2000) shows how lenders can exploit the degree of joint liability to
screen between borrowers of diﬀerent type. Safe borrowers prefer a higher degree of
joint liability and a lower interest rate, risky borrowers a lower degree of joint liability
and a higher interest rate. However, since the lender does not know borrower type
and collateral are not available, it has to oﬀer the same interest rate to all borrowers.
As a consequence, safe borrowers are driven out of the credit market (Stiglitz and
Weiss, 1981). On the other hand, risky borrowers with unproductive projects may
be cross-subsidized by safe borrowers with productive project (De Meza and Webb,
41987). Starting from the last consideration, safe borrowers, trough joint liability, are
attracted back in the credit market and risky borrowers are pushed away. Therefore,
joint liability is seen as an instrument to exploit local information to alleviate credit
market failures and to improve the economic eﬃciency. The notion that joint liabil-
ity induces borrowers to group with partners with the same risk proﬁle is challenged
by Sadoulet (200) who suggests that, in a context of missing insurance markets, ho-
mogeneity is not necessarily optimal. If the group fails, it will lose access to future
credit. Insurance arrangements could compensate the safe borrowers for covering for
the risky ones in cases of need, such as risk-premia transfers from the riskier to the
safer member. Heterogeneity, deﬁned by the literature as a second-best outcome, can
become the ﬁrst-best. Wydick (2001) develops a framework with dynamic incentives
to derive the possibility of intra-group insurance. In contrast to the independence
of project returns assumed by the authors mentioned until now, Laﬀont (2003) con-
siders exogenously ﬁxed potential pairs of ex ante identical entrepreneurs who carry
projects with correlated returns and have limited liability. The model incorporates
the problem of collusion leading to strategic group default. He describes optimal lend-
ing contracts in the class of individually incentive compatible, when the bank deals
with adverse selection problems. Group lending contracts are guided by the revela-
tion mechanism which do not rely on the ex post observability of investment project
returns but on private information only. When collusion occurs and information is
complete, group lending contracts are shown to be optimal.
Another argument for homogeneity focuses on the beneﬁts of group lending ex
post to group formation: the costs of monitoring a peer decrease if she undertakes
the same trade (Devereux and Fisher, 1993) and when there are social ties group lend-
ing can improve repayment rates and relax credit rationing (Floro and Yotopolous,
1991). Group lending may also reduce the incentive for moral hazard relative to
individual lending if the threat of social penalties is suﬃciently high in the case of
borrower default (Besley and Coate, 1995). Other models emphasize the potential
beneﬁts of peer monitoring and intra-group credit insurance. Stiglitz (1990), Con-
ning (1999) and Armendariz (1999) show how peer monitoring among borrowing
groups members reduce the incentive for risk-taking. Moreover, Varian (1990) and
Rashid and Townsend (1992) explain the role of insurance among group members
when negative stochastic shocks occur, if borrowers project returns are not highly
correlated. In contrast to the bulk of the literature, Prescott and Townsend (2002)
allow for collateral when groups of agents informed about each other pool resources.
Such arrangements are shown to be optimal in the presence of suﬃcient heterogeneity
among agents, including inequality. In contrast to the bulk of the literature, Prescott
and Townsend (2002) allow for collateral when groups of agents informed about each
other pool resources. Such arrangements are shown to be optimal in the presence of
suﬃcient heterogeneity among agents, including inequality.
Empirical studies explore either the issue of group formation or the occurrence
of peer monitoring. Wydick (1999, 2001) analyzes data from a microcredit program
5in Guatemala, comprising 139 groups in 1994, ﬁnding evidence of risk sharing with
group expulsions as the discipline device against defaults. Sadoulet and Carpenter
(2001), analyzing a 1995 microcredit program with 450 groups in Guatemala, provide
empirical evidence of the existence of both homogeneous and heterogeneous groups
with respect to risk at the same time. To explain this simultaneity, they argue that
group formation is endogenous and the risk taken by each borrower is jointly deter-
mined by her choice of partner. Heterogeneity is the result of the welfare-maximizing
actions of the members of the group. Group lending leads to heterogeneous groups
to the extent that riskier members pay a premium in good states of nature to safer
borrowers. By allowing transfers between members, heterogeneous formation of the
group is a Pareto improvement over homogeneous formation. Only individuals who
are too risky will not ﬁnd safe borrowers willing to match with them and, therefore
highly risky borrowers will form separate homogeneous groups. Lensik and Mehrteab
(2003) conduct a survey in 2001 among group members and group leaders of bor-
rowers who accessed to loans from two microcredit programs in Eritrea. Their main
results strongly indicate that groups are formed heterogeneously. Most importantly,
they do not ﬁnd support for the matching frictions hypothesis, in the sense that even
if they control for matching frictions, credit groups in Eritrea do not seem to consist
of borrowers of the similar risk type. De Weeerdt (2001) on the basis of household and
network data collected in a Haya village in Tanzania, ﬁnds that kinship, geographical
proximity, the number of common friends, clan membership, religious aﬃliation and
wealth strongly determine network formation. Insights in endogenous network for-
mation are used to assess vulnerability of households, distinguishing between those
likely to experience network shocks and those who are not. The results reveal that
there are weak networks that collapse under shocks and strong networks that can
cope with these shocks. The latter is likely if households tend to link up with others
of similar wealth, occupation and place of residence.
As far as monitoring is concerned, Hermes, Lensik and Teki (2001), dealing with
data coming from participants of 102 groups in Eritrea, provide an empirical analy-
sis of the impact of monitoring and social ties on moral hazard. Regular contacts
and short distance between the group leader and group member reduce moral hazard
behavior of group members and minimize misuse of loans. Also, Karlan (2003), ana-
lyzing FINCA Peru data, argues that monitoring costs are reduced when individuals
live closer to each other. Cultural heterogeneity and geographic dispersion matter
greatly to the eﬀectiveness of peer monitoring and enforcement of lending contracts.
Group lending is more eﬀective if individuals who live closer and are more alike cul-
turally are grouped together. This notion that social capital is a catalyst to ﬁnancial
intermediation is explored by Guiso et al. (2002) where regional variation in trust
across regions in Italy is found to impinge on the management of personal ﬁnances.
Finally, Ahlin and Townsend (2003) use heterogeneity in repayment rates among
groups to ﬁnd determinants of the success of joint liability arrangements. They ﬁnd
that in the poorest region of Thailand the role of social sanctions emphasized by
6Besley and Coate (1995) and Wydick (1996) seems crucial. None of these empirical
papers contemplate any form of collateral substitute, aside joint liability.
3 Risk Sharing and Group Default with Collateral:
A Theoretical Framework
The model presented below to illustrate how the presence of collateral aﬀects incen-
tives under joint liability is based on Besley and Coate (1995). We adapt their model
of the role of group sanctions facilitating the build up of social collateral to enhance
group lending to a situation in which sanctions among group members are limited
to the repossession of assets. First, we discuss the case of individual borrowing as
a benchmark. Then, we analyze the case of joint liability. After that we compare
the performance of individual and group lending. Finally, we characterize the role
of collateral in mitigating strategic default and facilitation mutual insurance in the
context of joint liability.
3.1 Individual Lending
A risk neutral borrower has a project, requiring one unit of capital, that lasts for
one period and yields θ units of income. The project return is known when the
project has been realized. Ex ante it is common knowledge that θ is distributed on £
θ,θ
¤
according to the distribution function F (θ) that has the properties of being
continuous on
£
θ,θ
¤
and satisfying F (θ)=0 .
At the end of the period, the borrower decides whether to reimburse the loan by
paying r>1, including both principal and interest, or to default. In the latter case,
the bank inﬂicts sanctions on the defaulting borrower, represented by the continuous
and increasing penalty function p(θ). The penalty function represents the loss to the
borrower due to seizure of proﬁts from the project by the lender, and it increases with
the project return.1
Evaluating the cost of repayment, r , and the penalty in case of default, p(θ),t h e
borrower chooses to repay if and only if r ≤ p(θ). We let the critical project return
at which the borrower is indiﬀerent between repayment and default by θ = φ(r),
where φ(·) ≡ p−1 (·) is deﬁned as the inverse of the penalty function p(·).S i n c ep(·)
is increasing in the project return, the loan will be repaid if and only if the project
return is greater than the critical project return. This implies the probability of
1The loss could also have nonmonetary elements such as pestering by debt collectors or loss of
face due to public announcements. Also, another way to specify the penalty function would be to
consider a repeated game in which the lender implements a trigger strategy of shutting down future
access to credit. This would be a less costly way for the lender to penalize defaulters. However,
it would require the introduction of incremental credit needss by borrowers, for the loss of credit
access to be suﬃciently costly.
7repayment is be given by ΠI(r)=1− F(φ(r)), with F (θ)=0 . The probability of
repayment is decreasing in r,i n s o f a rφ(r) is increasing.
We assume φ(1) > θ, so that from the bank’s perspective, it not possible to obtain
repayment for every project return. Therefore, there are possible proﬁt realizations
such that the borrower may decide not to pay the loan even if it were interest free
(i.e. r =1 ) . The default rate is, in fact, positive for all positive interest rates, i.e. for
all r>1.
3.2 Group Lending
We assume the group to be composed of two ex ante identical borrowers, borrower
1 and borrower 2 running two independent projects whose returns, θ1 and θ2,a r e
common knowledge once realized. They get a loan of two units of capital at the
beginning of the period and are jointly liable to repay 2r , the loan principal plus
interest rate, at the end of the period. The repayment decision is an all or nothing
decision, hence the group either repays 2r or does not repay. To contrast deliquent
borrowers the lender applies the penalties p(θ1) and p(θ2).
The repayment game is articulated in two stages. Both the borrowers simulta-
neously take the decision of contributing their share, r ,o rn o ta tt h eﬁrst stage of
the game. If they contribute, the loan is repaid and their payoﬀsa r e(θ1 − r,θ2 − r).
Whereas, if they do not contribute, then the loan is not repaid and the lender imposes
penalties: (θ1 − p(θ1),θ2 − p(θ2)). However, if one of the borrowers has decided not
to contribute, at the second stage of the game the other borrower has to decide
whether or not to repay the whole loan herself. In this case, if the loan is repaid by
borrower 1, the payoﬀ is (θ1 − 2r,θ2). If borrower 1, like borrower 2, instead decides
to take default alternative, the payoﬀsa r e
(θ1 − p(θ1),θ2 − p(θ2))
From borrower 2’s point of view, the former option has the advantage that she does
not face the lender sanctions. We now characterize the project return vectors (θ1,θ2)
for which there is group loan repayment.
Proposition 1 If θi > φ(2r) for either i =1or 2, there is repayment. If φ(r) <
θi ≤ φ(2r) for both i =1and 2, the loan may be repaid. Otherwise, i.e. φ(r) > θi
for either i =1or 2, there will be group default. The repayment rate under group
lending is:
ΠG(r)=
£
1 − {F(φ(2r)}
2¤
+[ F(φ(2r) − Fφ(r)]
2
Proof: See appendix.
Now, we want to compare repayment rate under group lending with that obtained
under individual lending:
8ΠG(r) − ΠI(r)=
£
1 − {F(φ(2r)}
2¤
+[ F(φ(2r)) − F(φ(r))]
2 − [1 − F(φ(r))]
= F(φ(r))[1 − F(φ(2r))] − [F(φ(2r)) − F(φ(r))]F(φ(r))
This expression captures the trade-oﬀ faced by lenders who are considering the
adoption of group lending to improve repayment rates. The ﬁrst term represents
the mutual insurance eﬀect. It is the probability that one borrower will have a
return above φ(2r), when the other has a return below φ(r). A return below φ(r),
when the individual lending scheme is adopted, would lead to insolvency and default.
In contrast, in group lending, trough the joint liability instrument, the much more
fortunate borrower, i.e. with a return above φ(2r), will also repay the share of the
less fortunate borrower, eﬀectively providing insurance against the lender penalty.
The second term represents the negative spillover from individual default under
joint liability. It is the probability that one borrower has a return between φ(r) and
φ(2r) while the other has a return below φ(r). In the individual lending scheme
the borrower with a return between φ(r) and φ(2r) would repay. However, under
joint liability, this otherwise solvent borrower would default because the burden of
repaying the whole group loan by herself exceeds the default penalty. In this case,
there is a negative drag down eﬀect from the group member with the unproﬁtable
project as her default imposes a burden on the other member, as well as on the lender
as the whole group loan is defaulted. There is group default, even though one group
member would have repaid if she had not been faced with liability for her partner’s
share. When one of the partner’s project fails, there is negative spillover on the other
group member who although is capable to cover her individual liability may opt to
default rather than paying the loan of the other group member.
3.3 Collateral
The above framework assumed no costs to a borrower from not contributing her share
of the group loan, except for the penalties to individual members imposed by the bank
in the event of group default. Here, we consider what happens in the case of group
lending when we allow for the possibility of asset repossession, where an individual’s
assets can be expropriated by a group lending partner. We demonstrate how the
existence of collateral can improve the performance of group lending.
In village economies, with tight knit communities, the imposition of sanctions
through hierarchical social networks can provide a mechanism to enforce joint liability
agreements and in many developing countries, this is the most appropriate context
in which to analyze group lending. The role of social norms to induce repayment
under joint liability is incorporated in the literature (e.g. Besley and Coate, 1995;
and Wydick, 1996) and, in particular, it has been shown how the lack of collateral
induced by widespread poverty, which makes credit inaccessible, can be overcome if
social cohesion can be harnessed to mitigate strategic default in group lending.
9We consider group lending performance in a diﬀerent environment in which (i)
social sanctions have limited impact and (ii) some borrowers possess resources for
collateral. These conditions can prevail in urban contexts in developing countries
where communities are atomized relative to rural communities. Also, in cities it is
possible for poor individuals to interact with better oﬀ individuals and potentially
form a group under a joint liability agreement. In general, the role of collateral in the
analysis of group lending has been ignored because microcredit arrangements were
precisely a response to grant credit to those without access to formal credit. Hence,
the benchmark has been a situation in which resources for collateral are lacking.
We complement existing analyses by allowing for collateral in order to motivate our
empirical analysis of group lending in an urban environment, as described in the next
section. While it might seem superﬂuous to grant microcredit to individuals who
have resources for collateral, we show that they can draw in group members who
would otherwise have no access to credit. Hence, the provision of microﬁnance to
individuals who also have access to formal credit does not necessarily lower welfare
as has been argued before (e.g. Mosley and Hulme, 1996). The gain in terms of
making possible access to credit for borrowers without collateral, in contexts where
social sanctions are insuﬃcient, could exceed the potential loss due to crowding out
of other poor potential borrowers.
We motivate repossession among group members in joint liability agreements from
the observation that, unlike individual lending contracts, group members can aﬀect
each others’ payoﬀs. For example, if an individual chooses not to contribute her share
of a group loan, then she may adversely aﬀect her partner’s payoﬀ. The loss faced by
an individual who contributes when her partner does not is r if she chooses to repay
the group loan herself, and p(θ) − r if she decides to default.
In either case, assuming that p(θ) ≥ r,s h ei sw o r s eo ﬀ than she would have been
if her partner had contributed her share. It is the fact that she suﬀe r st h i sl o s st h a t
may lead a borrower to expropriate her partner if the latter does not pay her share.
In terms of the repossession of assets, we only allow for the expropriation of those
investments in the project associated for the group loan. In particular, the share of
investment ﬁnanced with personal contributions can potentially be seized by other
members of the group.
The repossession penalty function, denoted by R(·) depends on the loss inﬂicted
by the noncontributing member on her partner, and also upon the proﬁtability of the
project associated with the defaulting loan. The latter says that if a noncontributor
has a relatively unproﬁtable project, then the exappropriation penalty is smaller.
Deﬁne the loss for a member with project return θ of the group when the other has
decided not to contribute as L(θ,r)=m i n[ p(θ) − r,r].
Let the repossession function be given by R
³
L(θ,r),θ
0´
= µλ[L,θ
0],with ∂λ
∂L >
0 and ∂λ
∂θ0 > 0,w h e r eµ is the personal contribution of the group member to her
individual investment project ﬁnanced with the group loan and λ[L,θ
0] is the fraction
of that contribution that would be repossessed by the other group member in the
10event of default by that group member. We now characterize the project return
vectors (θ1,θ2) for which there is group loan repayment, when there is collateral and
repossession is possible.
Proposition 2 As before if θi > φ(2r) for either i =1or 2, there is repayment. If
φ(r) < θi ≤ φ(2r) for both i =1and 2, the loan may be repaid. If φ(r) < θi ≤ φ(2r)
for one group member i but θj ≤ φ(r) for the other member j, then there is repayment
if p(θj)+R(p(θi) − r,θJ) >rOtherwise, there will be group default.
Proof: See appendix.
The repayment rate may be higher as individuals with unproﬁtable projects but
with collateral will not default in order to avoid loss of investment. In particular,
without collateral a situation in which borrower 1 is individually solvent but not
enough to cover the whole group loan, φ(r) < θ1 ≤ φ(2r), while the other group
member has a lower project return θ2 ≤ φ(r), would lead to group default. But, in
the case in which borrower 2 has collateral, there may be repayment as long as the
repossession costs exceed the gain from default R(p(θ1) − r,θ2) >r−p(θ2). Hence,
the negative spillovers from unproﬁtable projects are mitigated as group members
with proﬁtable projects and lenders can avoid the losses due to group default. At the
same time, collateral can enhance the prospects of group members with collateral to
obtain insurance under joint liability (i.e. whole group loan repayment by borrower
1, if θ2 ≤ φ(r) but θ1 > φ(2r)) as the willingness of other borrowers to form a group
with them as members rises.
Now we establish that given enough collateral availability, the possibility of asset
repossession among group members can guarantee higher repayment under joint than
individual liability. This would mean that the mutual insurance eﬀect of group lending
would dominate the negative spillover eﬀect.
Proposition 3 If mutual insurance is possible in group lending (i.e., φ(2r) < θ),the
repayment under group lending exceeds that under individual lending given suﬃciently
high group member personal contribution µ.
Proof: See appendix.
Collateral is thus a mechanism for avoiding default under joint liability. To the
extent that group default is not only harmful to the lender but also to group members
losing access to future credit, personal investment contributions can enhance group
formation under joint liability. In the present context, without social sanctions, unless
collateral is suﬃciently high, we cannot be certain that group lending will deliver
higher repayment rates than individual lending.
There is a ﬁnancial institution related to group lending under collateral, which also
involves joint liability, namely the use of cosigners. This refers to persons other than
the main borrower who assume equal liability for repayment of the loan. Cosigners
are eﬀectively guarantors of the debt and to be acceptable to the lender need either
11enough collateral or reputation. In the same vein, when a low risk borrower forms
a group with a high risk borrower, without recourse to social sanctions, it requires
collateral to be provided. Also, when an borrower with collateral forms a group
with a borrower without collateral, it requires that agent to invest in a low risk
project. In group lending, borrowers are eﬀectively each others cosigners. Normally
for someone to agree to be somebody else’s cosigner they tend to be very closely
related, usually next of kin, presumably as in those circumstances the cosigner has
private information about the borrower and also can more easily enforce nonpecuniary
penalties for default. However, in joint liability schemes, group formation among
relatives is ruled out by design and in urban environments social sanctions are limited.
Therefore group members are willing to be each other’s cosigners if they perceive
default suﬃciently unlikely due to either suﬃcient partner’s collateral or investment
project safety. Hence, in developing country cities, group lending can enhance the risk
sharing among households achieved with standard cosigner agreements by expanding
this type of arrangement to be applied between households belonging to diﬀerent
communal organizations or kinship networks.
4 Data and Survey Description
We analyze the group lending program which was launched in Benin’s largest city
in October 2001 by GNO’NU and IFOLD (Istituto Formazione Lavoro Donne), both
NGOs with seat in Cagliari in collaboration with Benin Interaction, a local NGO.
Regione Sardegna contributed 70% of the resources for the scheme and the remaining
30% was contributed by the above named organizations. The aim of the program was
to provide ﬁnancial services to poor women. While, the long term objectives were
the reinforcement of women’s participation in economic activity, and more generally,
in society, as well as the improvement of health and educational conditions for them
and their families. ﬁrst, we provide an account of the program. Then, we describe
the data.
4.1 Group Lending in Cotonou
The program was set up in the periphery of Cotonou, which is the largest city in
Benin with 1.1 million inhabitants and also the main cluster of economic activity.
The scheme followed the Grameen Bank model: a) clients are mainly women, of-
ten poor and vulnerable, who self-select each other to form solidarity groups, b) no
collateral is required, c) loans are initially small but tend to increase after success-
ful repayments, d) late repayment results in loss of future credit, and e) borrowers
are required to contribute to a saving fund. The ﬁrst and last features listed are
shown to induce substantial beneﬁts in terms of loan performance by Kaboski and
Townsend (2005). The undelying pressumption that it may be advantageous to chan-
nel resources to households speciﬁcally through women is consistent with theories of
12nonunitary household behaviour which do not assume families to mimick optimiza-
tion patterns by individual agents (Bourguignon, Browning, Chiappori and Lechene,
1994).
The ﬁrst contact with local people was through GNO’NU’s local staﬀ.T h e y
were assigned to Godomey, in the periphery of Cotonou, to attract people’s attention
through a series of information meetings about the program. These were held in the
main public squares of each neighborhood. When the ﬁrst meetings were called, the
staﬀ explained the program’s philosophy, rules and objective and potentially inter-
ested women were invited to attend the follow up meetings. They did not discriminate
the participants in terms of wealth, relying on the consolidated belief that microcredit
is not attractive to the better oﬀ. Then, women where selected by a ﬁrst screening
process based solely on possession of a valid national identiﬁcation card. Then, after
the self-selection in groups of three, women were screened by the veriﬁcation of no
family ties between members of the same group.
The ﬁrst 49 groups were served in 2001. The loan size was 20000 CFA, about
$30 per member, that is roughly equivalent to the monthly wage of a well paid job
in Cotonou at the time. The loan was payable over six months at the interest rate
of 11.8%, of which 3% was earmarked for a saving fund. 2 During the loan cycle,
October 2001-April 2002, borrowers were provided training courses to manage their
businesses. At the end of the sixth month, the repayment rate was 100% and in some
cases loans were repaid in advance. This was the ﬁrst loan cycle, with the second
now in progress.
When groups were already formed and working as a credit unit, GNO’NU’s local
staﬀ asked to ﬁll a questionnaire to have a better understating of beneﬁciaries’
socio-economic characteristics and previous credit history. The survey consists of 147
women mainly vendors concentrated in the luxury sector (62%), where ”luxury” is
deﬁned as the retail of nonessential items such as seasonings (17%), household services
and specialty goods (e.g. confectionery and beauty care products) (45%). The rest
of the women (38%) were in the basic sector, deﬁned as the retail of necessity items,
composed of staples (19%), fuel (9%) and vegetables (10%). We characterize vendors
in the basic sector as deploying low risk projects relative to vendors of luxury items.
This is because the demand for basic goods is income inelastic while the demand
for nonessential items is relatively elastic. Hence, borrowers selling basic goods have
safer returns in the face of cyclical income ﬂuctuations relative to groups members
selling luxury goods.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of ﬁnancial resources other than group lending,
namely credit from other sources and personal contribution. In terms of sources of
investment funds, credit from other sources was available to 12.2% and 94% declared
to have invested some personal contribution to the investment project. The data set
also contains information on group composition, education, place of residence and
activity, marital status, husband activity, proﬁts earned from previous project and
2In 2001 the inﬂation rate was 3%, implying the real interest rate to be 5.8%.
13number of children. Figure 2 shows that 46% of women lack any schooling attainment,
24% ﬁnished primary school and 26% ﬁnished secondary school. Also, 56% of women
are diversiﬁed relative to their husband’s activity. The latter is classiﬁed as either
blue collar (i.e. unskilled workers) or white collar (i.e. professionals). Blue collar
(e.g. ﬁshermen, agricultural laborers) tend to be associated with more basic sectors
relative to white collar (e.g. teachers, electricians). Hence, a household is diversiﬁed
either if the woman is in the basic sector and her husband white collar or if the
woman is in the luxury sector and her husband blue collar. Otherwise, the household
is specialized.
4.2 Variable Description and Methodology
We constructed the variables of interest from GNO’NU’s data ﬁle. The data ﬁle,
ﬁrstly, speciﬁes name, surname and group membership. Household composition in-
formation, including marital status, surname and profession of borrower’s husband,
number of children and place of residence is also available. Borrower’s activity is re-
ported by goods sold and workplace. Often women had two or more occupations at the
same time, but we ordered their activity by ﬁrst occupation. The ﬁnancial variables
are personal contribution to the investment, revenues earned from previous project,
credit from other sources and the microcredit loan amount and terms. Descriptive
statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis are presented in Table 1. The
dependent variable that we concentrate on is the personal contribution invested in
the activity. The personal contribution devoted to the activity is deemed to perform
the function of collateral. We use the TOBIT estimation procedure because data are
available for the entire sample but the dependent variable exhibits censoring at the
value of zero. In fact, we do not observe the personal contribution when is negative
as we do not have information on debt. Personal contribution, PCON, is deﬁned as a
share of the total investment, deﬁned as the sum of personal contribution, credit from
other sources and the micro-credit loan. In the same way, we construct COS, credit
obtained from other sources and OLDREV, a measure of maximum proﬁts earned
by previous project due by revenues on the total investment. We cannot analyze
repayment performance as there were no occurrences of group default precluding any
variability that can be exploited empirically.
The second group of variables describe sectors of activity. We initially distinguish
between two main sectors: basic and luxury. With BAS, basic, we divide women
selling staples, fuel and vegetables by women, in the luxury sector, selling seasonings,
services and specialities goods. Then, we specify the composition of groups with
respect to goods sold with GSTA, GFUE, GVEG, GSEA, GSER as the fraction
of group members selling staples, fuel, vegetables, seasonings, and specialty goods
respectively.
The third group of variables are household characteristics. In developing countries,
women’s decisions are generally subordinated to men consensus. Hence, we may
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if both men and women operate in the same sector. Diversiﬁcation of the family
is captured by HDIV, household diversiﬁcation, a dummy with value 1 if women
selling basic goods are married to a husband with white collar activity (e.g. teachers
and other professionals ) or selling luxury items are married to husband with blue
collar occupations (e.g. ﬁshermen and construction workers). Otherwise, HDIV is
zero. Group members who want to prioritize minimization of insolvency probability
a n di n s u r et h e m s e l v e s ,m i g h tt a k ei n t oa c c o u n tt h ee n t i r ef a m i l yr i s kp r o ﬁle, rather
than the marginal eﬀect on the risk proﬁle of this single project (e.g. Zeller, 1998).
Evaluation on a potential partner might be, therefore, inﬂuenced by consumption,
production and portfolio decisions. Goetz and Sen Gupta (1995) studies reveal loan
accorded to women, if not destined to traditional women activities, to be invested
in men of the family, husbands and sons, activities. Control over loans seems to be
higher when borrowers are either widow or single (Goetz and Sen Gupta, 1995). From
this consideration, the idea of the variables S, single, CHIL, children, and ER, early
repayment: dummies equal to 1 when the woman is single or widow and, if single or
widow, when repays the loan early. Moreover, control over loans may be inﬂuenced
by education, EDU, that may be a sort of positive spillover to the other women,
especially illiterate (De Weerdt, 2001). We also want to study whether personal
contribution may mitigate asymmetric information problems.
From the data set, we know that numerous women work and/or live in the same
neighborhood as other members of the group and we think forms of monitoring may
intervene, in such a way to substitute personal contribution. Figure 3 illustrates
IWOR and IRES, which are two dummies with value 1 if a particular borrower re-
spectively either works or lives in the same place as another member of the group.
We have that 77% of women share workplace with a peer borrower and 79% share
residence with a peer borrower. GWOR and GRES indicate the proportion of women
of a group working/living in the same place. Thus, they are 1 when all work/live in
the same place, 0 if all work/live in diﬀerent places, 1/3 and 2/3 if 1 or 2 work/live
in the same place. Figure 4 shows high prevalence of daily interaction as groups with
members working or living in the same place are common. Then, to investigate how
the selection process takes place, we explore the group formation process with respect
to risk: homogeneous versus heterogeneous group formation. GBAS is the fraction of
group members in the basic sector and takes the values of 1, 1/3 and 2/3 when all,
one or two members are in the basic sector. On the other hand, group diversiﬁcation
is expressed by GDIV, which takes the value of 1 when GBAS is either 1/3 or 2/3,
and the value of 0 otherwise. Figure 5 shows that 80% of groups are diversiﬁed with
a mix of safe and risky borrowers. Of the 20% specialized groups, 15% concentrate
in basic goods.
Furthermore, to characterize the nature of group formation when the group is
heterogenous, we highlight the odd one out operating in either the basic or the luxury
sector with OOOB and OOOL. What we want to study is whether operating either
15in the safe basic sector or in the luxury risky sector involves considerations regarding
insurance provision from the risky borrower to the safe borrowers in order for the
risky to be accepted into the group. In particular, OOOB = 1 if BAS = 1 and GBAS
= 1/3 and OOOL = 1 if BAS = 0 and GBAS = 2/3. Among odd one out borrowers
(i.e. those who make the group heterogenous), 19% sell basic goods and 7% luxury
goods. Finally, to draw the proﬁle of the odd one out we consider the possibility she
is married to a white collar professional. MOB and MOL are obtained by MARWHI ·
OOOB and MARWHI · OOOL respectively, where MARWHI is a variable describing
borrowers married with a white collar professional. Then, we consider the case of
an odd one out belonging to a diversiﬁed family: HC1 = (1- HDIV)·OOOB and to
a specialized family: HC2= HDIV·OOOL. These variables tell us whether borrowers
contributing insurance to the group originate from diversiﬁed households. The scope
and needs for household consumption smoothing aﬀect the possibilities for borrowers
to achieve risk sharing through group lending.
5R e s u l t s
In the ﬁrst regression, we use a LOGIT speciﬁcation to explore how borrower and
household characteristics determine the choice of a risky project. The dependent
variable is LUX= (1-BAS) and the independent variables we included are: HDIV,
COS, OLDREV and the control variables: EDU, S and CHIL. The results in Table
2 show that more credit from other sources, household diversiﬁcation and high sales
from previous project are associated with the selection to enter the luxury sector. It
seems that to the extent that a borrower is less liquidity constrained and more able
to smooth household consumption, risky projects are more attractive. Since the less
constrained borrowers choose riskier projects, we infer that the expected return in the
luxury sector is higher, and also that there is may some scope for insurance within
groups. The evidence presented below suggests that this latter conjecture is indeed
valid. Kevane and Wydick (2001) present evidence suggesting that pregnant women
tend to invest in safer projects. Probably this choice compensates peer borrowers for
the prioritary allocation of household income to child bearing and rearing expenses.
Throughout our regression analysis we have as dependant variable the fraction of
total investment which is ﬁnanced with personal contribution of the group member.3
We use this variable to measure the collateral represented by the assets that the
group member has personally contributed to her investment project. We control for
both household and project characteristics. In the ﬁrst set of regressions, we include
variables characterizing the risk structure of both the household and the group. The
ﬁrst interesting outcome is that credit from other sources is an imperfect substitute
of personal contribution: the coeﬃcient of COS is negative, highly signiﬁcant and
3The repayment rate, which seems to be the focus of many empirical studies of group lending,
cannot be used here because there are no instances of default.
16in most speciﬁcations it is close to 2/3. The fact that the estimated coeﬃcient
is negative suggests that personal contributions and credit from other sources are
indeed substitutes. But the fact that the absolute value of the estimated coeﬃcient
is less than one suggests that credit from other sources is an imperfect substitute for
personal contributions. Such a result is, to some extent, not surprising. First, credit
from other sources may only be available on dear terms. Second, having loans with
other creditors might induce borrowers, in moments of ﬁnancial diﬃculties, not to
reimburse the microcredit ﬁrst. This result turns out to be robust throughout all of
our speciﬁcations.
From Table 3, women in diversiﬁed households tend to put personal contributions
roughly 7% higher. This may be due to two separate eﬀects. First, diversiﬁed house-
hold may be less able to provide insurance to other group members under the joint
liability agreement because if their project is proﬁtable but their husband’s income
suﬀers a negative shock, they are more likely to bailout the household before they
bail out other group members. Hence, household diversiﬁcation deters the borrower
from engaging in mutual insurance. This eﬀect may be mitigated by providing a
higher personal contribution for collateral purposes. Second, another possible reason
for higher personal contributions is that diversiﬁed households may be in a better
position to engage in larger investments. Therefore, group members from such house-
holds are more likely to have to resort to personal contributions as microcredit and
credit from other sources are limited.
Also, the fraction of women within the group working or living in the same place
is associated with lower personal contributions by 21% and 19% respectively. Having
an additional group member sharing location is correlated with a reduction of about
6% in the personal contribution. Working in the same place can be associated to the
capacity of being able to monitor eﬀort and living in the same place may be translated
into a superior knowledge about group members types. Hence by mitigating moral
hazard and adverse selection, when more group members work and live in the same
place, there is a reduction in the need for collateral. Table 3 includes two other
group characteristics. The higher share of group members with projects in the basic
sector, the lower personal contributions. One more group member who is a vendor of
necessity items is associated with a drop of 5% in the share of personal contributions.
Because, essential items are always in demand, they are not subject to decline on
the face of cyclical ﬂu c t u a t i o n s .H e n c e ,m o r ew o m e ni ng r o u pw o r k i n gi nt h eb a s i c
goods sector, means more low risk group members. Now, we characterize group
heterogeneity by denominating the group as diversiﬁed if it has both low risk members
(project in basic sector) and high risk members (project in luxury sector). The latter
are low risk because the income elasticity of the products they supply is much higher.
In diversiﬁed groups, the share of investments ﬁnanced with personal contributions
is 13% higher according.
In Table 4, we introduce two additional variables which give information about
the group member’s position within the group. One is dummy variable which is 1
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tells us whether the woman lives in the same building as another woman in the
group. These variables are not highly signiﬁcant when we do not include the group
indicator about the fraction of women sharing workplace or living quarters. When
we include the latter, we ﬁnd that conditional upon sharing location, being one of
the women in the group in such situation is associated with a higher contribution.
This higher collateral may compensate for risk from operating in the same local
market, which limits the scope for risk diversiﬁcation within the group. The eﬀects
a large share of low risk members and of group heterogeneity remain robust both
in signiﬁcance and magnitude. Having more basic good projects in the group leads
to less need for collateral while heterogenous risk groups are associated with higher
personal contributions.
Whether the project is in the basic or luxury sector is also not informative until we
incorporate variables controlling for the individual’s impact on group heterogeneity.
The dummy variable indicating that the investment is in a project to supply basic
goods is insigniﬁcant in the ﬁrst and second group of regressions, that is when we do
not specify the type of odd one out in the group. These results suggest the presence
of other elements determining group formation. However, in Table 2 we show that
when we run the LOGIT regressions we know the choice to operate into the luxury
sector to be inﬂuenced by belonging to a diversiﬁed households and having more
credit from other sources compared to a women entering in the basic sector. As far
as individual and household characteristics are concerned, what matters is household
diversiﬁcation. A higher personal contribution, when women belongs to diversiﬁed
families, may be interpreted as a minor capacity of selling insurance to high risk
members. In fact, if the husband’s activity goes bad, it is plausible suppose the
woman will divert the credit to the family. Thus, in order to be accepted by the
group the personal contribution has to be 6 to 8 % higher. More precisely, women
in the volatile sector from diversiﬁed households need to provide less collateral. Blue
collar husband lowers probability of group loan default, whereas women in low risk
sector in diversiﬁed households need to provide more collateral. White collar husband
hampers insurance to the group. Regarding project characteristics, having obtained
high returns may be a signal of goodness of the activity and hence requires less
personal contribution. Moreover, being the odd one out of the luxury sector implies
more collateral in order to be accepted in the group. In other words, high risk
members buy insurance from low risk members. On the other hand, being the odd
one out in the basic sector lowers the probability of group default. Then, low risk
group members when the other members are both high risk, face a lower personal
contribution requirement. Agents without collateral but willing to play this insurance
r o l ei nt h eg r o u pm a yb ea b l et oa c c e s sc r e d i t .
In Table 5, we incorporate two sets of new variables. One tells us whether the
woman who makes the group heterogenous, which we label odd one out (OOO hence-
forth) is in the basic or luxury sector. If she is in the basic sector, her role is basically
18that of providing insurance to the group. In this case, the associated drop in the
personal contribution is between 25 and 28%. If she is in the luxury sector, other
things equal, she may raise the risk proﬁle of the group and is receiving insurance.
Our ﬁndings indicate a tendency for the contribution of OOO risky borrowers to be
higher. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that OOO group members in the luxury sector only
have to put more collateral when they are in diversiﬁed households. When they are
in specialized households, odd one out members in luxury sector actually contribute
do not have to contribute additional collateral. This is because originating in a undi-
versiﬁed household actually mitigates incentives for strategic default when the risky
project performs well. Then, there is no need to divert resources from the group to
the family to compensate for negative shocks in their husband’s income. This solves
the main problem posed by risky borrowers which is not that they require insurance
when projects fail but rather that bailouts may be caused by strategic behavior. In
contrast, when OOO borrowers are low risk, their need to provide collateral is lessened
by household diversiﬁcation. In this case, what matters is the ability of the borrower
to provide insurance in bad states of the world, which is facilitated by household
diversiﬁcation rather than specialization.
Finally, Table 6 introduces an independent variable measuring sales to investment
ratio from the last project of the group member. This variable captures both the
borrowers track record as an investor and availability of funds for collateral. The
results indicate that the former eﬀect is more important as higher revenue in the
past is associated with less need for collateral in the present. When we control with
this past performance measure, some of the group variables become insigniﬁcant.
In particular, common work place and residential location are not associated with
personal contributions in any systematic way. However, the risk proﬁle of the group
has an impact which is consistent . As before, more safe borrowers induce lower
collateral and group heterogeneity leads to higher collateral requirements for risky
borrowers.
The lack of need for collateral complete for borrowers from specialized households.
In the presence of this variable the most important eﬀect, in terms of the group’s
risk structure aﬀecting collateral, is that the OOO from the luxury sector group
member from a specialized household contributes 30% less of her own resources to
the overall investment, completely oﬀsetting the need for higher personal contribution
arising from her inducement of group heterogeneity. Hence, as long as they are not
impeded household consumption smoothing demands, even risky borrowers making
the group heterogenous do not to hamper intra-group insurance through strategic
default. Addressing the issue of homogeneous groups versus heterogeneous groups,
belonging to a low risk group, in the sense that a higher fraction of group members has
projects in basic good provision, means less probability for joint liability to generate
group default. This outcome is costly to all group members in the sense that access
to microcredit is lost. In order to avoid group default, some group members may
decide to bailout others. Having to make such a contribution increases ﬁnancing
19costs. Hence, other things equal, individuals avoid situations in which they expect
the prospect that they have to bailout the group. In particular, the probability of
bailout is minimized the more homogenous the group is because conditional upon
success an individual’s project, the probability that the other members of the group
failed is at its lowest. However, from the point of view of the lender, this implies
that groups are specialized and there is no risk pooling in group formation. This may
raise the likelihood of collusion. In a group that diversiﬁe sr i s k ,c o l l a t e r a lm i t i g a t e s
bailout prospects. The more diversiﬁed is the group, the higher personal contributions
to investment are to oﬀset bailout prospects. Collateral is indeed a catalyst for risk
sharing beneﬁcial both to the jointly liable group and to the lender. The evidence
is very robust that collateral is a vehicle to mitigate moral hazard, due to strategic
default, which in turn facilitates risk sharing. While borrowers with risky projects but
with good track records can avoid higher collateral due to working or living elsewhere
relative to peers, they cannot avoid higher collateral due to the higher probability of
bailouts by safe borrowers associated with risk pooling.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In the model, we show that collateral is a mechanism for avoiding default under joint
liability. To the extent that group default is not only harmful to the lender but also to
group members losing access to future credit, personal investment contributions can
enhance group formation under joint liability. In the present context, without social
sanctions, unless collateral is suﬃciently high, we cannot be certain that group lending
will deliver higher repayment rates than individual lending. Hence, the negative
spillovers from unproﬁtable projects are mitigated as group members with proﬁtable
projects and lenders can avoid the losses due to group default. At the same time,
collateral can enhance the prospects of group members without collateral to access
credit under joint liability as the willingness of other borrowers to form a group with
them rises when they provide insurance by self-selecting into the safe basic sector.
Our empirical results show that heterogenous groups emerge in which members
with high risk investment projects mitigate default prospects through collateral. This
shows that joint liability is conducive to insurance provision as long as there is a
mechanism for high risk investors in the group to compensate low risk investor mem-
bers. In the past, it has been suggested that transfers or side payments could sustain
heterogenous groups in what eﬀectively amounts to high risk members purchasing in-
surance from low risk ones. However, there no evidence provided that such transfers
take place. Yet, the evidence of intra-group insurance would seem consistent with
the notion that patient borrowers will avoid strategic default as loss of future credit
is very costly.
We establish that personal contributions to investment projects play the same role
as collateral in that low risk group members are willing to join liability agreements
with high risk group members who provide substantial personal contributions. While
20generally group members in the basic sector are able to join without providing collat-
eral, as they provide insurance. Members in the luxury sector also seem to be able to
provide insurance as long as they come from specialized households. This is because
when they come from diversiﬁed households, and they do well, they ﬁrst have to help
at home before they can commit proﬁts to bail out other group members out.
In general, collateral in the form of personal contribution to the investment
project, mitigates risk in group formation. In our empirical analysis, we ﬁnd that
when borrowers live or work together, when they come from undiversiﬁed house-
holds, when they are low risk and in homogenous groups, ans when they have good
track records, then the need for collateral is lessened. There is a synergy between low
and high risk group members in that, in the absence of social capital, borrowers with-
out collateral would not have access to credit. At the same time, those borrowers by
specializing in low risk activities provide insurance to borrowers with collateral who
would obtain credit in any case but otherwise would lack access to insurance against
default. This ﬁnding about the beneﬁts of group lending when agents with diﬀerent
collateral possibilities interact is consistent with the ﬁnding by Ahlin and Townsend
(2002). They report evidence from microcredit programs in Thailand that in more
prosperous regions, intra-village wealth heterogeneity is associated with more inten-
sive use of group lending and that there is a U-shaped relationship between group
borrowing and household wealth. The common concern that when the poorest are
not the recipient of microcredit there is a welfare loss may not be operational in this
contexts. Crowding in of poor borrowers rather than crowding out may operate in
urban environments, and other settings in which heterogeneous households interact,
in which the level of social capital common in rural village communities is unlikely
to materialize and provide suﬃcient information access and strong enough sanctions
to sustain group lending without collateral.
In developing countries, where a large share of households live perilously close to
subsistence thresholds, household earnings risk can have a particularly substantial
impact on welfare. Mechanisms for risk sharing across households are of paramount
importance. Attanasio and Davis (1996) have shown that even in the US, where con-
tingent security markets are far more advanced than in any developing country, the
joint distribution of household earnings and consumption observed in cross sectional
data is inconsistent with the complete insurance against earnings risk availablein the
Arrow-Debreu setting. Hence, when insurance markets are missing and household
consumption smoothing via self-insurance is scarcely feasible, the introduction mech-
anisms to further risk sharing is crucial. Group lending schemes, mostly used in rural
communities, when deployed in urban areas - or other situations in which agents with
and without collateral interact - could facilitate risk sharing between households.
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The speciﬁcation of the game and subsequent proofs follow Besley and Coate
(1995) but rather than using social sanctions to punish strategic default by borrowers,
group members resort to asset repossession as speciﬁed in the set up of the model
above. The repayment game has two stages. At the ﬁrst stage, borrowers decide
whether to contribute (c) or not to contribute (n) their share of the outstanding loan
payment due, r. At the second stage, conditional on the decisions taken by both
borrowers at the ﬁrst stage, each chooses either to pay, (P),o rd e f a u l t(D). The
Game leads to seven Cases of Subgame Perfect Equilibria.
Case1: If θi ≥ φ(2r),i=1 ,2, then there are three sub-cases:
(a) If R(r,θi) >rfor i =1 ,2, then {(c,P)(c,P)} is an equilibrium
(b) If R(r,θ1) >r,t h e n{n,(c,P)} is an equilibrium
(c) If R(r,θ2) >r,t h e n{(c,P),n} is an equilibrium
Case 2: If θ1 > φ(2r) and θ2 < φ(2r), then there are two sub-cases:
(a) If R(r,θ2) <r ,t h e n{(c,P),n} is an equilibrium
(b) If R(r,θ2) >r ,t h e n{(c,D),(c,P)} is an equilibrium
Case 3: If θ2 > φ(2r) and θ1 < φ(2r).T h i si ss y m m e t r i ct oC a s e2 .
Case 4: If θi ∈ (φ(r),φ(2r)),i = 1 , 2 ,t h e n{(c,D),(c,D)} and {n,n} are both
equilibria
Case 5: If θi < φ(r),i = 1 , 2 ,t h e n{n,n} is the only equilibrium
Case 6: If θ1 ∈ (φ(r),φ(2r)) and θ2 < φ(r), then there are two subcases:
(a) If p(θ2)+R(p(θ1) − r,θ2) >r ,t h e n{(c,D),(c,D)} is an equilibrium
(b) If p(θ2)+R(p(θ1) − r,θ2) <r ,t h e n{n,n} is an equilibrium
Case 7: If θ1 < φ(r) and θ2 ∈ (φ(r),φ(2r)).T h i si ss y m m e t r i ct oC a s e6 .
Proof of Proposition 1: If at least one borrower has a return bigger than φ(2r),
we are in either Case 1, 2 or 3. In either Case the loan is repaid. If both borrowers
have returns between φ(r) and φ(2r),w ea r ei nC a s e4a n ds i n c e{(c,D),(c,D)} is
an equilibrium the bank’s loan may be repaid. In the remaining Cases ( 5, 6 and 7),
the bank’s loan will not be repaid if R(·)=0 .
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 : The only diﬀerence from this and Proposition 1, is the case
when one borrower receives a return θ
0 between φ(r) and φ(2r) and the other borrower
receives a return φ smaller than φ(r) but such that p(θ)+R(p(θ
0) − r,θ) >r .T h i s
corresponds to Cases 6(a) and 7(a). In both cases {(c,D),(c,D)} is an equilibrium
and hence the bank loan may be repaid.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 : For all µ>0,d e ﬁne the function θµ :( φ(r),φ(2r)) →
(θ,φ(r)) implicitly from the equation p(θµ (θ
0)+µλp(θ
0) − r,θµ (θ
0)) = r. For social
sanctions of strength µ, it should be clear that if one borrower has a return θ
0 ∈
(φ(r),φ(2r)) and the other has a return θ < φ(r), then repayment will occur if and
only if θ > θµ (θ
0). The probability of the latter event is F(φ(r)) − F (θµ (θ
0)).I t
follows that we my write the repayment rate under group lending as
25ΠG(r,µ) ≡ 1 − F (φ(r))([2F (φ(2r)) − F (φ(r))] + 2
Z φ(2r)
φ(r)
[F (φ(r)) − F(θµ (θ
0))]dF(θ
0)
The last term represents the probability that one borrower has a return between
φ(r) and φ(2r), and the other has a return lower than φ(r), but suﬃcient high for
repayment to occur, while the rest corresponds exactly to the RHS of (2) above.
Substracting (1) from (5) yields,
ΠG(r,µ) − ΠI (r) ≡ F (φ(r))[1 − F (φ(r))] − 2
Z φ(2r)
φ(r)
[F(θµ (θ
0))]dF(θ
0)
The ﬁrst term in this expression, that favors group lending, is positive. The sec-
ond, that favors individual lending, is negative. But, as µ gets large this second term
goes to zero. To see this, note ﬁrst that for all θ
0 ∈ (φ(r),φ(2r)),limµ→∞θµ (θ
0)=θ;
that is, as social sanctions get increasingly severe the critical project return nec-
essary to induce repayment gets nearer and nearer to the minimal return. This
follows from part (iii) of Assumption 1. Since F is continuous, it follows that for
θ
0 ∈ (φ(r),φ(2r)),limµ→∞F(θµ (θ
0)) = F(θ).M o r e o v e r , s i n c e F is a distribution
function, the sequence of functions hF(θµ (θ
0))i
∞
µ=1is bounded. Thus we may con-
clude from the Bounded Convergence Theorem that limµ→∞
R φ(2r)
φ(r) F(θµ (θ
0))dF(θ
0)=
R φ(2r)
φ(r) limµ→∞F(θµ (θ
0))dF(θ
0)=
R φ(2r)
φ(r) F(θ)dF(θ
0)=0.
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Figure 1 – Financing Structure 
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Figure 2 – Borrower Characteristics 
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Figure 3 – Borrower’s Relationship to Other Group Members 
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Figure 4 – Group Members’ Daily Interaction  
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Figure 5 – Group’s Risk Heterogeneity 
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Figure 6 – Activity of Borrower Inducing Group Heterogeneity 
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Table 1 – Descriptive statitistics 
 
 
Variables 
 
Definition Average  Std.  dev.  Obs. 
PCON  Personal contribution to the activity  0.534  0.253  147 
COS  Credit from other sources  0.065  0.188  147 
BAS  =1 if in the Basic sector  0.380  0.487  147 
GSTA  Fraction of the group selling staples  0.217  0.219  49 
GFUE  Fraction of the group selling fuel  0.088  0.147  49 
GVEG  Fraction of the group selling vegetables  0.065  0.133  49 
GSEA  Fraction of the group selling seasonings  0.176  0.225  49 
GSER  Fraction of the group providing services or 
selling specialities 
0.442 0.207  49 
OLDREV  Revenue earned from previous activity  0.039  0.056  147 
HDIV Household  diversification  0.462  0.5  147 
MARWHI  =1 if Married with a “white collar”  0.251  0.435  147 
S  =1 if Single  0.149  0.357  147 
ER  =1 if Early repayment  0.054  0.227  147 
EDU Education 3.857  3.839  147 
CHIL  Number of children  3.149  2.124  147 
GWOR  Fraction of the group working in the same place 0.469  0.233  49 
GRES  Fraction of the group living in the same place  0.453  0.202  49 
IWOR  =1 A borrower works in the same place as 
someone else in the group 
0.231 0.423 147 
IRES  =1  A borrower lives in the same place as 
someone else in the group 
0.210 0.409 147 
GBAS  Fraction of the group in the Basic sector  0.378  0.222  49 
GDIV Group  diversification  0.795  0.404  49 
OOO  =1 if Odd one out  0.265  0.443  147 
OOOB  =1 if Odd one out in the Basic sector  0.190  0.394  147 
OOOL  =1 if Odd one out in the Luxury sector  0.068  0.252  147 
MOB  =1 when Odd one out in the Basic sector and 
married with a “white collar” 
0.047 0.213 147 
MOL  =1 when Odd one out in the Luxury sector and 
married with a “white collar” 
0.013 0.116 147 
HC1  =1 when Odd one out belonging to a 
diversified household 
0.170 0.376 147 
HC2  =1 when Odd one out belonging to a 
specialized household 
0.142 0.351 147 
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Table 2 – Project Risk Selection 
 
Dependent variable 
 
 
Independent 
variables  Luxury item vending 
project Dummy 
 
 
COS  1.311*  1.653* 
 (1.095)  (1.118) 
    
HDIV 1.103***  1.088* 
 (0.388)  (0.396) 
    
OLDREV 1.314**  1.138*** 
 (3.392)  (3.518) 
    
Control household 
characteristics 
NO YES 
Number of Obs.  147  147 
R2  0.0558 0.0674 
 
 
 
Table 3 – Collateral and Group Characteristics 
 
 
Dependent variable  
 
Independent 
variables 
Personal Contribution 
 
COS     -0.638***     -0.621***     -0.623***  -0.594***  -0.582***  -0.585*** 
  (0.099)  (0.099) (0.100) (0.097) (0.097) (0.098) 
         
HDIV 0.084**  0.086***  0.085***  0.069**  0.071**  0.068** 
  (0.037)  (0.037) (0.038) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) 
         
GWOR       -0.208***  -0.199***  -0.201*** 
       (0.081)  (0.081)  (0.081) 
         
GRES       -0.190***  -0.188***  -0.189*** 
       (0.093)  (0.093)  (0.093) 
         
GBAS -0.160**  -0.159*  -0.154*  -0.211***  -0.208**  -0.196*** 
  (0.087)  (0.087) (0.095) (0.087) (0.086) (0.094) 
         
GDIV 0.130***  0.138***  0.138***  0.125***  0.131***  0.131*** 
  (0.048)  (0.048) (0.048) (0.047) (0.048) (0.048) 
         
Control household 
characteristics 
 
NO YES  YES  NO  YES  YES 
Control project 
characteristics 
 
NO NO  YES  NO  NO  YES 
Number of Obs 
 
147 147  147  147  147  147 
Pseudo R2 
 
0.8662  0.8973 0.8977 1.0416 1.0620 1.0639 
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Table 4 – Collateral and Borrowers Relation to the Group 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable 
  
Independent 
variables 
Personal Contribution 
 
COS    -0.621***    -0.607***    -0.609***  -0.582***  -0.568***  -0.572*** 
  (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) 
       
HDIV 0.073**  0.078***  0.074**  0.072**  0.074***  0.071** 
  (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) 
       
IWOR -0.074*  -0.069*  -0.069*  0.052  0.049  0.049* 
  (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.094) (0.094) (0.094) 
       
IRES -0.013  -0.010  -0.010  0.117*  0.124*  0.124* 
  (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) 
       
GWOR      -0.288*  -0.271*  -0.273* 
      (0.171)  (0.171)  (0.171) 
       
GRES       -0.380***  -0.389***  -0.391*** 
      (0.150)  (0.150)  (0.150) 
       
GBAS -0.186***  -0.184***  -0.176**  -0.214***  -0.211***  -0.197*** 
  (0.088) (0.087) (0.096) (0.086) (0.086) (0.094) 
       
GDIV 0.135***  0.142***  0.142***  0.130***  0.136***  0.136*** 
  (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) 
               
Control for 
household 
characteristics 
 
NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Control for 
project 
characteristics 
 
NO NO YES NO NO YES 
Number of 
Obs 
 
147 147  147  147  147  147 
Pseudo R2  0.9170 0.9419 0.9426 1.1033 1.1291 1.1315 
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Table 5 – Collateral, Risk Heterogeneity and Member’s Group Position  
 
 
Dependent variable  
 
Independent 
variables 
Personal Contribution 
 
COS -0.653***  -0.641***  -0.642***  -0.609***  -0.598***  -0.604*** 
  (0.097)  (0.098) (0.096) (0.096) (0.096) (0.095) 
         
HDIV 0.076**  0.076**  0.091***  0.072**  0.072**  0.087*** 
  (0.041)  (0.041) (0.042) (0.040) (0.040) (0.041) 
         
IWOR -0.075*  -0.070*  -0.054 0.015 0.014 0.002 
  (0.044)  (0.044) (0.044) (0.094) (0.093) (0.092) 
         
IRES -0.020  0.017  0.003  0.115*  0.121*  0.133** 
  (0.045)  (0.045) (0.045) (0.073) (0.073) (0.072) 
         
GWOR      -0.216  -0.203  -0.150 
       (0.171)  (0.170)  (0.170) 
         
GRES       -0.379***  -0.386***  -0.365*** 
       (0.148)  (0.148)  (0.147) 
         
GBAS -0.212***  -0.215***  -0.499***  -0.227***  -0.228***  -0.457*** 
  (0.094)  (0.093) (0.155) (0.092) (0.092) (0.153) 
         
GDIV 0.141***  0.148***  0.202***  0.135***  0.142***  0.187*** 
  (0.049)  (0.050) (0.054) (0.048) (0.048) (0.053) 
         
OOOB -0.008  -0.119**  -0.309***  -0.018  -0.217  -0.291** 
  (0.057)  (0.057) (0.151) (0.055) (0.055) (0.149) 
         
OOOL 0.067*  0.078  0.189**  0.040  0.051*  0.138 
  (0.087)  (0.088) (0.103) (0.086) (0.086) (0.103) 
          
MOL -0.179  -0.187  -0.284*  -0.175  -0.184  -0.288* 
  (0.177)  (0.177) (0.197) (0.173) (0.172) (0.193) 
         
MOB -0.216***  -0.205***  -0.077 -0.185**  -0.175**  0.053 
  (0.103)  (0.103) (0.136) (0.102) (0.102) (0.134) 
        
Control household 
characteristics 
 
NO YES  YES  NO  YES  YES 
Control project 
characteristics 
 
NO NO  YES  NO  NO  YES 
Number of Obs 
 
147  147 147 147 147 147 
Pseudo R2  1.0658  1.0877 1.1968 1.2287 1.2523 1.3334 
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Table 6 – Collateral, Heterogeneity and Borrower Track Record  
 
 
 
Dependent variable  
 
Independent 
variables 
Personal Contribution 
 
COS  -0.739***  -0.730***  -0.730***  -0.715***  -0.705***  -0.730*** 
  (0.079)  (0.080) (0.079) (0.080) (0.081) (0.080) 
         
HDIV  0.032  0.032  0.047  0.028  0.029  0.050* 
  (0.034)  (0.034) (0.035) (0.032) (0.032) (0.036) 
         
IWOR  -0.100  -0.103  -0.110*  -0.074  -0.079  -0.094* 
  (0.082)  (0.082) (0.081) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) 
         
IRES  0.024  0.027 0.039 0.038 0.042 0.050 
  (0.061)  (0.061) (0.061) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) 
         
GWOR  0.034 0.044  0.077  -0.010  0.002  0.050 
  (0.149)  (0.150) (0.149) (0.151) (0.152) (0.152) 
         
GRES  -0.130  -0.135 -0.126 -0.126 -0.141 -0.128 
  (0.127)  (0.127) (0.126) (0.126) (0.130) (0.129) 
         
GBAS  -0.197***  -0.192***  -0.365***  -0.210***  -0.204***  -0.383*** 
  (0.082)  (0.082) (0.130) (0.084) (0.084) (0.131) 
         
GDIV  0.094***  0.098***  0.132***  0.112***  0.117***  0.150*** 
  (0.043)  (0.044) (0.047) (0.044) (0.044) (0.047) 
         
OOOB  -0.047 -0.046  -0.156  -0.005  0.005  -0.156* 
  (0.047)  (0.047) (0.124) (0.041) (0.041) (0.091) 
         
OOOL  0.039 0.043  0.108  -0.007  -0.004  0.057 
  (0.069)  (0.070) (0.084) (0.064) (0.064) (0.083) 
         
MOL  -0.251**  -0.254**  -0.329***      
  (0.139) (0.139)  (0.155)       
         
MOB  -0.155**  -0.149 -0.056       
  (0.087) (0.088)  (0.112)       
         
OLDREV  -0.193***  -0.189***  -0.185***  -0.190***  -0.186***  -0.182*** 
  (0.338)  (0.342) (0.334) (0.341) (0.345) (0.338) 
        
Control household 
characteristics 
 
NO YES  YES  NO  YES  YES 
Control project 
characteristics 
 
NO NO  YES  NO  NO  YES 
Number of Obs 
 
147  147 147 147 147 147 
Pseudo R2  4.0518  4.0661 4.2016 3.7988 3.8181 3.9164 